Live Questions in Psychology and Metaphysics

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Excerpt from Live Questions in Psychology and Metaphysics: Six Lectures Selected From Those Delivered to the Classes in Cornell UniversityBut for men who like Dr. Porter believe in a mind as some thing distinct from the body, it seems to me that this distino tion will be most welcome.Nor is there any more reason why Huxley and the men, who, agreeing with him, think there is no mind as distinct from matter, should not accept my definition of sensation - though they cannot, of course, accept the distinction I make between it and perception. In fact, on their ontological theory, sensa tion is what I have described it, just that and nothing else. It can be nothing else than a state of the nerve centres - for they do not admit any mind, of which it can be said to be an act or a state. Sensation therefore can be only a physical or physio logical phenomenon. But then, what becomes of perception? I do not see that they can have any use for the word, or any meaning they can attach to it, or any act or state it can be needed to describe.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully, any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.