Strategic Social Choice

Angebote / Angebote:

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

Lieferbar in ca. 20-45 Arbeitstagen

Preis

147,00 CHF

Verfügbarkeit:

Lieferbar

Produktinformation
Kundenbewertungen

Produktinformation

Artikelnummer 9783642265051
Status Lieferbar in ca. 20-45 Arbeitstagen
Autor Peleg, Bezalel / Peters, Hans
Einband C, Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences, Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods, Methodology of the Social Sciences, Microeconomics, Philosophy of Mathematics, Quantitative Economics, biotechnology, Economics and Finance, Management science, Welfare economics, game theory, Economic Theory, Social Sciences, Economic theory & philosophy, Social research & statistics, Kartonierter Einband (Kt)
Sprache eng
Seiten 154
Verlag Springer Nature EN
Reihe Studies in Choice and Welfare
Publikationsjahr 2012

Kundenbewertungen

Dieser Artikel hat noch keine Bewertungen.