The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1908, Vol. 5 (Classic Reprint)

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Excerpt from The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1908, Vol. 5Op. Cit., p. 82, note. 5 Psychology, General Introduction, p. 315. Cf. Pp. 310 - 311.Judd adds, by a unique type of activity which we describe when we use the word 'consciousness.' The conclusion that the self, or the basal fact of psychology, stands in close relation to its body, presses the question: What, more precisely, is the nature of this relation? Differently phrased, the question may-read: What reference shall the psychologist make to physical phenomena? In order to answer this question it is meces sary to ask more generally wherein adequate scientific procedure consists. The task of any scientist is twofold: first, to describe or portray and, secondly, so far as possible to explain the phenomena which he treats. Observation, analysis, and classification are, taken together, the main factors of scientific description, and psychological description, the exact portrayal of conscious life, involves keen observation of the psychic fact, complete analysis of it into its con stituent factors, and adequate classification of it by its likeness and unlikeness to other phenomena. Explanation, in the narrowly sci entific sense, consists in the discovery of the additional phenomena, psychic and physical, to which a given psychic fact is related (other wise than by its likeness or its difierence). This other phenomenon may itself be a psychic fact - as when a memory is explained as due to repeated perception, or it may be a fact of another order physical (in the narrow sense), or physiological, or biological. It will be observed that nothing in this conception essentially contra, dicts the doctrine that science is always descriptive, never explana tory - an answer always to the question how? Not to the ques tion why?6 For the kind of explanation which such a doctrine excludes from science is explanation of the ultimate, metaphysical sort, not explanation conceived as a tracing of antecedent and conse quent or of simultaneous correlates. One further statement must be made with reference to the ideal scientific explanation. Such an explanation would serve to classify the phenomena which it ex~ plained. For phenomena may be grouped and classified not only according to their internal likenesses and unlikenesses, but also with reference to the likenesses and differences of the phenomena which explain them.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully, any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.